Is the US adopting the gray zone cyber playbook?

When President Trump referenced America’s ability to “darken” parts of Caracas during Operation Absolute Resolve, the comment stood out not because of what it confirmed, but because of what it implied. Delivered without technical detail, the remark hinted at capabilities that sit somewhere between diplomacy and force, and between cyber operations and traditional military action.

Whether or not the statement reflected a specific technical action in the raid on Venezuela is almost beside the point. What mattered was the signal: cyber-enabled disruption of civilian or economic systems is no longer treated as an abstract possibility, but as a plausible instrument of state power operating below the threshold of open conflict.

This framing aligns with events that preceded any visible kinetic or political resolution. Venezuela’s state-owned oil sector, the backbone of the country’s economy and a primary source of regime revenue, reportedly experienced cyber-related disruptions that affected operations and exports. Attribution remains contested, and no public confirmation has been offered. But the timing and the target were notable. Pressure seemed to be applied not during the confrontation itself, but earlier—targeting the systems that sustain national power.

These developments point toward a more deliberate “gray zone” approach, one that uses cyber interference against economic and civilian infrastructure as part of sustained pressure campaigns rather than isolated, surgical actions.

For a global power operating in an environment of constant competition, this shift may be less radical than it initially appears.

Why the gray zone matters

Gray zone conflict is often framed as a deviation from traditional deterrence. But in practice, it reflects how competition among major powers increasingly unfolds. Rarely does rivalry manifest as declared war. Instead, it plays out through incremental pressure applied across economic, informational, political, and technological domains.

Cyber capabilities are particularly well suited in this space. They allow nation-states to impose friction, degrade confidence, and shape behavior without crossing clear thresholds that would trigger conventional military escalation. Unlike kinetic force, cyber effects can be reversible, deniable, and calibrated over time.

From a technical perspective, this flexibility is not accidental. Modern cyber operations rely less on single exploits and more on persistent access, identity abuse, supply chain dependencies, and detailed mapping of complex systems. These attributes make cyber tools effective not just for disruption, but for long-term leverage.

For years, the United States invested heavily in advanced cyber capabilities while remaining cautious about integrating them openly into broader coercive strategies. This restraint, however, was not universally shared.

Lessons from the Russian model

For more than a decade, U.S. officials criticized Russia’s use of hybrid warfare, particularly its integration of cyber operations, economic pressure, information campaigns, and civilian infrastructure disruption. In Ukraine and elsewhere, civilian impact was not incidental, as it was a key part of the strategy.

From a technical standpoint, Russia demonstrated that persistent interference against power grids, telecommunications networks, healthcare systems, election infrastructure, and government services could impose strategic costs without provoking decisive military retaliation. Even relatively limited actions, such as GPS jamming affecting civilian aviation in the Baltics and Eastern Europe, reinforced the same lesson: disruption does not need to be catastrophic to be effective.

These operations often relied on modest technical effects amplified through operational timing and uncertainty. Intermittent outages, degraded reliability, and ambiguous attribution created pressure on governments and populations without crossing clear red lines.

 Regardless of how Moscow’s objectives are judged, the effectiveness of cyber and electronic interference as tools of statecraft did not go unnoticed. In recent  years, other countries, particularly China and Iran, have steadily expanded these operations and capabilities

How gray zone campaigns operate

From a cyber perspective, gray zone operations rarely resemble single attacks. They unfold as campaigns.

Access is often established years in advance through credential compromise, third-party vendors, or exposed management interfaces. Once inside, operators map dependencies, understand failover mechanisms, and identify points where limited disruption can produce outsized operational impact.

These effects, when applied, are typically restrained. Rather than causing prolonged blackouts or physical damage, campaigns may induce intermittent failures, data integrity concerns, or operational delays that erode confidence and consume resources. The goal is not destruction, but pressure: forcing leaders and operators to operate under uncertainty.

They are also designed to be reversible and deniable. The ability to stop, pause, or modulate disruption is as important as the ability to initiate it. This control allows cyber operations to be synchronized with diplomatic signals, economic sanctions, or other forms of statecraft.

Statecraft in an era of constant competition

The events in Venezuela underscore a broader reality: cyber-enabled pressure is now a standard component of how states pursue political outcomes. It shapes environments well before traditional markers of conflict appear.

The strategic question is no longer whether cyber-enabled economic interference will be used, but how seamlessly it is integrated with other tools. Sanctions, diplomacy, military posture, and cyber operations increasingly function as parts of a single continuum rather than separate domains.

This raises natural questions about where such pressure may be applied next. In the Western Hemisphere, U.S. attention has turned toward Cuba and Colombia. Beyond the region, Iran remains a focal point of coercive strategy, where cyber operations have already been used to strain industrial systems and public confidence without crossing into open conflict.

The point is not to predict specific operations, but to recognize that pressure via cyber operations has moved from the margins of policy into its core.

What this means going forward

For a global power, ignoring gray zone dynamics is increasingly unrealistic. However, embracing them does introduce new forms of risk. Cyber interference below the threshold of war offers flexibility and deniability, but it also creates ambiguity around control, proportionality, and long-term stability.

Escalation in this space rarely arrives as a single dramatic event. Instead, it accumulates through repeated disruptions that gradually blur the line between competition and conflict, often without clear signaling or agreed-upon thresholds.

Managing that risk requires more than technical capability. It demands disciplined judgment, an understanding of complex systems, and an appreciation for how seemingly modest cyber effects can cascade politically and economically.

The gray zone may be unavoidable, but how states operate within it will shape whether it becomes an effective tool of competition, or a source of sustained instability.

Aaron Estes, Vice President at Binary Defense, is a three-time Lockheed Martin Fellow with more than 25 years of experience in cybersecurity and software engineering.  Estes has spent much of his career advancing mission resilience and adaptive defense for the Department of Defense, intelligence community, and leading defense contractors.